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IN HER OWN UNASSUMING BUT PENETRATING WAY, VIRGINIA WOOLF 
strongly advised authors "to live in the presence of reality." Since 
"philosophic words, if one has not been educated at a university, are apt 
to play one false," Woolf could not define precisely what she meant 
by "reality." It was, she said, "something very erratic, very un- 
dependable-now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of news- 
paper in the street, now in a daffodil in the sun." She could describe 
reality only by noting that whatever it "touches, it fixes and makes per- 
manent"; reality is what appears when the world is "bared of its covering 
and given an intenser life." Reality is "invigorating." The writer's busi- 
ness, Woolf concluded, was to find this reality, to "collect it and communi- 
cate it to the rest of us." 1 
Woolf's concept of "reality" is complex, and its implications are worth 
examination. It differs considerably from the idea of reality which is pre- 
valent among literary historians, and which is exemplified by Rene Wel- 
lek's definition of realism as "the objective representation of contempor- 
ary social reality." For Wellek reality is not, as for Woolf, a normative 
concept. It is instead a collection of facts which exist independently in the 
world and await reproduction by the writer. This same concept of reality 
underlies Jose Ortega y Gasset's distinction between realist and modern- 
ist art: comparing the work of art to a window pane, he said that works of 
realism look through the glass and make it invisible, whereas modernist 
works focus instead on the glass itself and see only a confused blur of 
color and form.2 
That sophisticated literary historians should hold this view of reality is 
somewhat startling, since philosophy long ago rejected the belief that 
1 Woolf, A Room of One's Own (New York: Harcourt, 1957), 14. 
2 Wellek, Concepts of Criticism (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1963), 240; Ortega y 
Gasset, The Dehumanization of Art (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968), 10. 
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reality exists "out there" beyond the glass, waiting to be copied. We can 
say with some assurance that the perception of reality is instead a creative 
process. In the words of John Dewey: "We do not have externally given 
to us some fixed conception of reality which we can compare with our 
ideas, and thereby see how much agreement with reality the latter have. 
Reality, like everything else that has meaning, is a function of our ideas." 
Not only is reality cognitively constructed, it is, as our sociologists tell us, 
'socially constructed." A society's reality is a cultural artifact; it is a 
"social achievement, directed by the community of needs and interests 
and fostered in the interests of cooperation."3 
The question of reality is important for the literary historian because it 
is commonly agreed that every novel presents an image of the world in 
which its characters exist and interact.4 The naive philosophical realism 
that has unfortunately characterized literary history, however, has led to 
two alternative interpretations of this fictive image of the world. Either, in 
the case of literary realism, this fictive image is understood to be an 
accurate reproduction of "objective" reality, or, in the case of other 
literary forms, this fictive image is detached from "objective" reality and 
explained in terms of the conventions of literary composition.5 Naive 
philosophical realism thus virtually compels the literary historian to inter- 
pret changes in the literary representation of reality in terms of the trans- 
formation of purely aesthetic priorities, and it leads him to underestimate 
the possibility that these changes may in fact be caused by a larger cul- 
tural evolution in the apprehension of reality itself. 
The particular manner in which a novel represents reality is, however, 
as Virginia Woolf s remarks amply illustrate, difficult o specify. The 
novel's world is often fanciful or imaginary, and what reality the novel 
does portray is highly selective. At first blush, therefore, it would seem to 
follow that literary historians are correct, and that the reality represented 
by the novel is merely a literary construct, more or less unrelated to the 
actual world of the surrounding culture. 
But this conclusion is a non-sequitur. What has been demonstrated is 
only that the fictive world of the novel is, in some respects, different from 
3Dewey, "Knowledge as Idealization," in his Philosophy, Psychology and Social Prac- 
tice, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965). 159; Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1968), 1; C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order (New York: Dover, 1956), 116. 
4This insight is common to such otherwise disparate critics as Georg Lukacs, The Theory 
of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 60; and Frank Kermode, 
The Sense of an Ending (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), 140. 
5Even the pathbreaking work of Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality 
in Western Literature (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), 107, conceived the differing 
portrayals of reality in Western literature to be primarily a matter of various literary 
techniques in the representation of "the objective world of reality." 
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the world we experience in everyday life. A deeper analysis, however, 
reveals that the artistic success of a novel depends precisely upon the 
similarity of its fictive world, in certain other respects, to the ordinary 
reality we inhabit. The reality created by a novel is a very special kind of 
reality, whose nature is determined by the cultural functions which the 
novel performs. These cultural functions are manifested in the aesthetic 
criteria by which the novel is judged. A criterion of major and unvarying 
importance is that the quality of a novel depends upon the richness and 
depth with which it illuminates the possibilities of human value and sig- 
nificance. But these possibilities only have meaning if they are perceived 
by the audience to be real, not merely literary constructs. The aesthetic 
criterion will thus be satisfied only if the novel's audience believes that, 
given the nature of the actual world they experience, the potential for the 
realization of these possibilities truly exists. The novel, as a contempor- 
ary author states, is "an affirmation of what ought to be and what, in the 
artist's devout opinion, is, whether or not it can be reached from where 
we are."6 
The novel, in other words, presents the reality of human meaning, 
which I shall call "moral reality." This is the complex form of reality 
which Virginia Woolf urged writers to find, collect, and communicate. 
Moral reality is a cultural artifact which, like all such artifacts, evolves in 
time. Moreover, as Woolf s example illustrates, moral reality does not 
exist in some abstract ethical realm. It is instead predicated upon specific 
and demonstrable assumptions about the nature of the world, about the 
way in which individuals, society, or the natural universe must exist in 
order for human meaning to be possible. For a novel to succeed aestheti- 
cally, these assumptions must be recognized by its readers as descriptive 
of the reality they inhabit, and thus no matter how fancifully a novel may 
otherwise portray the world, it cannot violate these assumptions without 
simultaneously breaching the aesthetic criterion that requires the novel 
seriously to explore the possibilities of human value. 
Once this aesthetic understanding of the novel is accepted, and once an 
ingenuous philosophical realism is safely laid to rest, the concept of moral 
reality becomes a legitimate and important analytic tool for the literary 
historian. In this article I will explore its usefulness in providing a founda- 
tion for a theory of genre in the novel. The concept of moral reality 
provides such a foundation because the novel is, as R. P. Blackmur has 
stated, "a theoretic form for our experience of life,"7 and moral reality 
establishes the predicates for that form. It not only thematically defines 
6John Gardner, On Moral Fiction (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 162. 
7 Blackmur, "Between the Numen and the Moha," The Lion and The Honeycomb: Essays 
in Solicitude and Critique (New York: Harcourt, 1955), 303. 
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relevant aspirations, and, by implication, pertinent emptations, but it 
also entails specific assumptions about the nature of the human, social, or 
natural materials out of which that form will emerge. In this sense moral 
reality enables the novelist to create coherence out of the "buzzing, 
blooming confusion" of his experience. Most literary historians view the 
novel, as does Lionel Trilling, as "a perpetual quest for reality, the field of its 
research being always the social world, the material of its analysis being 
always manners as the indication of the direction of man's soul."8 The 
concept of moral reality, however, points in the opposite direction: it is 
only because a novel presupposes a reality, a conception of manners, 
soul, and society, that it can exist at all. The moral reality assumed by the 
novelist will thus deeply affect he literary presentation of his experience; 
it will influence such various aesthetic oncerns as methods of characteri- 
zation, rendition of dialogue and action, treatment of natural and social 
settings, and organization of narrative presentation.9 
Novels which share a common moral reality will therefore also share 
common aesthetic attributes. We classify these family resemblances as 
genres. In nineteenth-century American fiction, for example, it is com- 
monly recognized that the romance and the realist novel represent wo 
such genres. In this article I will analyze an example of each of these 
genres and demonstrate hat the characteristic aesthetic attributes of each 
can be traced back to a systematic apprehension of moral reality. The 
usefulness of this approach can best be illustrated by contrasting itto the 
usual manner in which historians of American literature have discussed 
these two genres. 
The traditional framework of analysis has been to contrast he romance 
to the realist novel, and to conclude that, while the latter "objectively" 
represents reality, the former must be understood in terms of its use of 
particular literary devices. The naive philosophical realism of this ap- 
proach is exemplified by Richard Chase, whose The American Novel and 
Its Tradition is probably the most influential ttempt o distinguish the 
romance from the realist novel.'0 Chase begins his discussion in what 
appears to be a promising manner. "The main difference between the 
novel and the romance," he asserts, "is the way in which they view 
reality." It soon becomes apparent, however, that what Chase means is 
8 Trilling, "Manners, Morals, and the Novel," The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Litera- 
ture and Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1953), 205. 
9 On this point, see Georg Lukacs, Realism in our Time: Literature and the Class Strug- 
gle, trans. John and Necke Mander (New York: Harper, 1971), 19. 
10 Chase, The American Novel and Its Tradition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1957), 1-28. 
For an example of Chase's influence, see Richard H. Brodhead, Hawthorne, Melville, and the 
Novel (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1976), 20-25. There is a good discussion of Chase in 
David H. Hirsch, Reality and Idea in the Early American Novel (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 
32-49. 
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that the novel describes objective reality, while the romance does not. 
Chase claims that the novel "renders reality closely and in comprehensive 
detail." In the novel, character "is more important han action and plot," 
and character is realized in its "real complexity of temperament and 
motive." Characters are "in explicable relation to nature, to each other, 
to their social class, to their own past." Events in the novel, "will usually 
be plausible." The reality of the romance, on the other hand, is described 
in terms that are largely negative. The romance, Chase contends, "feels 
free to render reality in less volume and detail." It prefers action to 
character, "'and action will be freer in a romance than in a novel, encoun- 
tering, as it were, less resistance from reality." Romance action will 
feature "astonishing events" which "are likely to have a symbolic or 
ideological, rather than a realistic plausibility." Despite the fact that 
"character may become profoundly involved," characters in the romance 
are "somewhat abstract and ideal," not "completely related to each other 
or to society or to the past." In short, "being less committed to the 
immediate rendition of reality than the novel," the organizing principle of 
the romance is not objective social reality, but the use of literary devices 
such as "mythic, allegorical, and symbolistic forms." 
Defining the romance in terms of its literary techniques, however, turns 
out to be vague and imprecise, leading to endless and unproductive de- 
bates on such questions as whether The Golden Bowl is truly a romance or 
a novel. The point, of course, is that the literary themes and techniques 
identified by Chase are used and employed by a great many more works 
than those that by consensus constitute examples of the American 
nineteenth-century omance. The inability systematically to comprehend 
the aesthetic attributes of the romance has thus led to the widespread and 
confusing diversity of opinion which now dominates the contemporary 
critical scene. For Perry Miller, the romance is the connection between 
character and Nature. F. 0. Matthiessen views it as primarily a concern 
for "the life within the life," whereas for Terrence Martin it has a certain 
kind of improbability. Joel Porte, on the other hand, considers the ro- 
mance to be a form of stylized art that attempts to explore the darker sides 
of the self. Daniel Hoffman believes the romance depends upon 
"folklore, myth, and ritual," while Nicolaus Mills sees no significant 
distinction at all between the romance and the realist novel." 
11 Miller, "Romance and the Novel," Nature's Nation (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967), 
260; Matthiessen, American Renaissance: Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and 
Whitman (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), 271; Martin, The Instructed Vision: Scottish 
Commonsense Philosophy and the Origins of American Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1961), 58; Porte, The Romance in America: Studies in Cooper, Poe, Haw- 
thorne, Melville, and James (Middletown: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1961), 26; Hoffman, Form 
and Fable in American Fiction (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1961), 26; Mills, American 
and English Fiction in the Nineteenth Century: An Antigenre Critique and Comparison 
(Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973), 11-12. 
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No critic has thus far taken seriously the possibility that the aesthetic 
characteristics of the romance can be explained with reference to a sys- 
tematic understanding ofmoral reality. This is perhaps because, firmly 
and unconsciously entrenched in our own cultural reality, we see in the 
moral reality of the past only the unreal world of myths and symbols. Our 
inability to discern the moral reality of romance, in short, is but the 
other side of our uncritical acceptance of the "objective" reality of 
realism. In the following two sections of this article, I hope to unsettle 
both these prejudices by discussing two short stories, one in the genre of 
the romance, the other in that of realism. Just as realism is not "the 
objective representation" of social reality, but is instead a genre whose 
common aesthetic haracteristics derive from a particular understanding 
of moral reality, so the romance can be defined with reference to a moral 
reality of precisely analogous logical properties and coherence. 
* * * 
The two short stories I have selected for discussion are "Drowne's 
Wooden Image" by Nathaniel Hawthorne and "The Real Thing" by 
Henry James. Both concern the transformation f reality into art, the 
former in the romance mode, the latter in the realistic. I have chosen them 
not because they are so very exceptional, but because they are competent 
and representative examples of their respective genres. 
"Drowne's Wooden Image" is the story of a colonial wood carver who 
specializes in the figureheads of ships. Although e has "no inconsider- 
able skill of hand" (350), his sculptures appear wooden and mechanical, 
as does Drowne himself.12 Drowne is commissioned by a Captain Hun- 
newell to carve a figurehead for the brig Cynosure. As is customary with 
Hawthorne, there is a secret in the matter, and Drowne is observed work- 
ing mysteriously atnights upon his new commission. The work, an image 
of an exotic and flirtatious lady, becomes Drowne's masterpiece, ac- 
knowledged by the townspeople and by the painter Copley, who serves in 
the story as a sort of narrative alter ego. In the process of sculpting the 
work, Drowne turns into "a modern Pygmalion" (353), deeply in love 
with either the carving or its model. Copley observes Drowne bending 
over the sculpture "as if he would have embraced it and drawn it to his 
heart; while, had such a miracle been possible, his countenance xpressed 
passion enough to communicate warmth and sensibility to the lifeless 
oak" (353). When Captain Hunnewell comes to collect the completed 
carving, he is accompanied by a lady who is the exact replica of the 
12 All page references to "Drowne's Wooden Image" are from Hawthorne, Mossesfrom 
an Old Manse (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1882). 
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statue. The town bursts with the speculation that the wooden image has 
come to life, but Hawthorne is careful to inform us that she is a young 
Portuguese lady of rank, temporarily and secretly under the protection of 
Captain Hunnewell. 
Marius Bewley, in an excellent analysis of "Drowne's Wooden Im- 
age," has uncovered "a metaphysic concerning the nature of reality" in 
Hawthorne's work. He has found that in Hawthorne reality is associated 
with an "inner sphere of feeling and sympathy," and is attainable only 
through the kind of "self-surrender" of which love is an emblem. But in 
order to make Hawthorne compatible with our own modern sensibilities, 
Bewley interprets this reality in a purely psychological sense. "Haw- 
thorne's inner sphere of reality is little more than the quiet and pure 
communion of a human mind and heart with others in love and charity." 
Bewley thus reads the lesson of the story to be that " Lself-surrender in 
art, no less than in human relationships, is required if one is to enter into 
and possess inner reality."'13 
Bewley's psychological interpretation of Hawthorne's inner reality, 
however, can at most elucidate why Drowne fulfilled himself in his 
sculpture. It cannot explain why the carving was itself a success; why, in 
its presence, the townspeople "felt impelled to remove their hats" (356), 
and feared as if before something "preternatural" (356). Nor can it ex- 
plain why the carving should have affected Copley with "speechless 
astonishment" (353) when "the image was but vague in its outward pre- 
sentment" (353); or why, when the real Portuguese lady unhinged her fan, 
the fan in the hand of the carving should have simultaneously broken. We 
are often tempted to interpret such incidents as evidence merely of that 
irritating flavor of the miraculous with which Hawthorne felt impelled to 
season his fiction, and to dismiss them as immature "symbolism" or 
"allegory." Nothing could be more revealing of our tendency to appro- 
priate the reality of another culture and reinterpret it in light of our own 
assumptions. And nothing could interfere more seriously with our attempt 
to recover the moral reality behind Hawthorne's work. For while Haw- 
thorne in his prefaces claimed a certain freedom from "the realities of the 
moment," and even from "the probable and ordinary course of man's 
experience," his fiction tells us again and again of his ambition to create a 
literature "before which the forms and fantasies that conceal the inner 
idea from the multitude vanish at once and leave the naked reality 
underneath." 14 
13 Bewley, The Eccentric Design: Form in the Classic American Novel (New York: Col- 
umbia Univ. Press, 1959), 23, 127, 132, 174, 138. 
14 Hawthorne, Pref., The House of the Seven Gables (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1883), 
13, 15; "The Intelligence Office," in Hawthorne, Mossesfrom an Old Manse, 379. See Jesse 
Bier, "Hawthorne on the Romance: His Prefaces Related and Examined," Modern Phi- 
lology, 53 (1955), 17-24. 
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We must suspend the suspicion, then, that Hawthorne's fiction is at 
times merely an exercise in fantasy, and we must take seriously Haw- 
thorne's perception of a "naked reality." This reality is evidently a source 
of human value and significance, for as it is perceived and appropriated by 
Drowne, his moral and spiritual faculties awaken and develop. Haw- 
thorne carefully describes Drowne's development not merely as a 
psychological transformation, but also as the acquisition of insight. 
Drowne states that "there has come a light into my mind" (352); he 
claims that he has been able to produce his magnificent statue because a 
"wellspring of inward wisdom gushed within me as I wrought upon the 
oak with my whole strength, and soul, and faith" (355). Drowne, in other 
words, acquires knowledge, and this knowledge, though "inward," is of 
something beyond himself. 
For Hawthorne, Drowne's awakening as a human being and his growth 
as an artist are one and the same phenomenon. What was lacking in 
Drowne's mechanical carvings is also what was missing from his own 
moral development. Hawthorne tells us that the lifeless carvings 
looked as if a living man had there been changed to wood, and that not only the 
physical, but the intellectual nd spiritual part, partook of the stolid transforma- 
tion. But in not a single instance did it seem as if the wood were imbibing the 
ethereal essence of humanity. What a wide distinction is here! and how far 
would the slightest portion of the latter merit have outvalued the utmost of the 
former (351)! 
What Drowne and his productions need is to regain contact with "the 
ethereal essence of humanity." Hawthorne tells us that this essence does 
not reside in outward forms; it can be found neither in the correct physical 
outlines of Drowne's wooden carvings, nor in the "dignified station in the 
church" (361), which Drowne mechanically fills. It is instead a matter of 
"that deep quality, be it of soul or intellect, which bestows life upon the 
lifeless and warmth-upon the cold, and which, had it been present, would 
have made Drowne's wooden image instinct with spirit" (350). 
The spirit which Drowne eventually discovers in himself and communi- 
cates to his statue is for Hawthorne a locus of human value. This spirit, 
however, is not merely a matter of Drowne's subjective consciousness. It 
is transpersonal, for it is recognized and confirmed by the inhabitants of 
Boston, who cannot help but respond to its presence in Drowne's statue. 
And it is objective, by which I mean that it has an ontological existence 
entirely apart from Drowne. Although Drowne finds the spirit within him- 
self, he also uncovers it within the statue, as though it were preexisting 
within the wood itself: 
It seemed as if the hamadryad of the oak had sheltered herself rom the unim- 
aginative world within the heart of her native tree, and that it was only neces- 
A Theory of Genre 375 
sary to remove the strange shapelessness that had incrusted her, and reveal the 
grace and loveliness of a divinity (351). 
The "divinity" within the wood actively intervenes at several points in 
the story. Hawthorne, for example, describes Drowne's statue in animate 
terms. Hawthorne notes that, although imperfect in design, attitude, and 
costume, the statue nevertheless "drew the eye from the wooden clever- 
ness of Drowne's earlier productions and fixed it upon the tantalizing 
mystery of this new project" (351). The spirit within the statue actually 
prefigures itself in time, and reveals itself through means other than its 
physical presence. Although "the image was but vague in its outward 
presentment; so that, as in the cloud shapes around the western sun, the 
observer rather felt, or was led to imagine, than really saw what was 
intended by it," yet it fixes Copley in "speechless astonishment" (353). 
Although this manifestation of the statue's spirit seems miraculous, it is in 
fact Hawthorne's attempt to render the reality of a spirit that for him 
actually exists in the world as a "comprehensive sympathy above us." 15 
The objective existence of this spirit colors the entire structure of the 
story's narrative. The fact that the fan in the hands of the carving and of 
the actual Portuguese lady break simultaneously, for example, is but a 
narrative expression of the spiritual coincidence between the lady and her 
image. In the reality of the spirit everything touches, everything is con- 
nected to everything else, and the usual constraints of time and space no 
longer apply. Harry Levin once said of Reuben Bourne's murder of his 
son in "Roger Malvin's Burial" that it was "one of those coincidences 
that seem to lay bare the design of the universe." It would have been 
more accurate to say that in Hawthorne's universe of meaning, there are 
no coincidences. Emerson perfectly captured this aspect of the moral 
reality of Hawthorne's fiction when he remarked that "the perception of 
real affinities between events (that is to say, of ideal affinities, for those 
only are real) enables the poet thus to make free with the most imposing 
forms and phenomena of the world, and to assert the predominance of the 
soul." 16 
Emerson's use of the term "real" is, like Virginia Woolf s, essentially 
normative. In "Nature," Emerson stops short of an outright idealism. In 
a similar way, Hawthorne does not deny the reality of Drowne's wooden 
carvings, of that "strange shapelessness" (351) that surrounds the 
spirit. Hawthorne's point is only that human value does not inhere in such 
aspects of reality, and that to collect and communicate moral reality the 
artist must therefore carve through to the hidden realm of the spirit. 
Although this realm of the spirit exists objectively, Hawthorne makes 
15 Hawthorne, The House of the Seven Gables, 59. 
16 Levin, The Power of Blackness (New York: Vintage, 1960), 55; Emerson, "Nature," in 
Nature, Addresses and Lectures (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1903), 54. 
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clear that Drowne can discern it in nature only because he has first 
discovered it within himself. Through the "passionate ardor" (357) of his 
love, Drowne reaches "the very highest state to which a human spirit can 
attain" (362); he becomes "consistent with himself" (362). Drowne, in 
other words, finds that his own "ethereal essence" (351) is matched by an 
animate spirit in nature; when Drowne becomes fully alive to his own 
soul, he also becomes capable of perceiving "the hamadryad" within the 
oak. Conversely, when Drowne loses his "warmth and sensibility" (353), 
he also reassumes his "mask of dulness" (362), and is left "without the 
power even of appreciating the work that his own hands had wrought" 
(362). Nature and character thus mirror each other; Drowne can discern in 
nature only so much spirit as he has first realized within himself. 
In his portrait of Drowne's development, then, Hawthorne describes 
the conditions under which the moral reality of human value can be 
known. These conditions are paradoxical, for although moral reality ob- 
jectively exists, it can only be known through a form of knowledge that is 
personal and experiential. Note that this form of knowledge entirely 
bypasses socially authoritative channels of truth. For example, the 
"well-spring of inward wisdom" that gushes forth from Drowne's heart 
enables him to sweep aside the formal and socially approved "rules of 
art" (355) with which he is confronted by Copley. Drowne needs no such 
social guidance because he has personally experienced the reality of the 
spirit, and the artistic "rules" of the academy represent at best a second- 
hand form of knowledge. As Thoreau once said, "I should say that the 
useful results of science had accumulated, but that there had been no 
accumulation of knowledge, strictly speaking, for posterity; for knowl- 
edge is to be acquired only by a corresponding experience. How can we 
know what we are told merely?" 17 
Thoreau's observation illuminates why Hawthorne characteristically 
speaks of moral reality as hidden. Merely to be "told" something is to 
receive information which strikes the outward ear or the intellect, but it is 
not to assimilate that information into inward patterns of experience. 
Most men do not assimilate the information they receive; in the ordinary 
course of their lives they perceive only the external outlines of nature 
that are necessary for the instrumental activities of the intellect. The 
inner core of their personality is not touched. This inner core can be 
engaged only by being brought into contact with a corresponding spirit 
within nature, a spirit that transcends the external senses. Whenever 
the realm of spirit manifests itself in "Drowne's Wooden Image," Haw- 
thorne carefully notes how it appears beyond "its outward presentment" 
(353), and speaks instead directly to its observer's experience. It is not 
17 Thoreau, A Week on the Concord and Merrimack Rivers (1849; rpt. New York: Signet, 
1961), 311. 
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seen, but is rather "felt" or "imagined" (353) by its viewers. Hawthorne 
describes how the townspeople sense in Drowne's statue "an indefinable 
air and expression" (356), and respond with fear because the statue seems 
"preternatural" (356), and from another "sphere" (356). Drowne's statue 
is not merely seen; it instead reaches out and touches, and even alters the 
experiences of those who observe it. The statue, in fact, is a perfect 
emblem of the living spirit which lies everywhere implicit within nature. 
Copley immediately discerns this spirit, exclaiming, "Here is the divine, 
the life-giving touch. What inspired hand is beckoning this wood to arise 
and live" (353)? And a living statue is precisely what the general popula- 
tion of Boston will later perceive. The legend which is then created and 
handed down in "the traditionary chimney corners of the New England 
metropolis" (357), while false to an outward fact, is nevertheless true to 
an inner spiritual reality. By the end of the story, Boston's inhabitants 
have come to experience "the predominance of the soul." 
Hawthorne's focus on the experiential assimilation of spiritual reality 
deeply affects the aesthetic characteristics of his story. Notice, for exam- 
ple, Hawthorne's construction of the scene of Copley's first visit to 
Drowne's studio. We are told that, "in the dearth of professional sym- 
pathy" (351), Copley wishes to cultivate Drowne's friendship. On enter- 
ing the shop, Copley pays Drowne a dubious compliment, which the latter 
properly rejects. Copley is amazed. "How is it," he asks, "that, posses- 
sing the idea which you have now uttered, you should produce only such 
works as these?" 
The carver smiled, but made no reply. Copley turned again to the images, 
conceiving that the sense of deficiency which Drowne had just expressed, and 
which is so rare in a merely mechanical character, must surely imply a genius, 
the tokens of which had heretofore been overlooked. But no; there was not a 
trace of it. He was about to withdraw hen his eye chanced to fall upon a 
half-developed figure which lay in a corner of the workshop (352-53). 
What is fascinating about this scene is Hawthorne's notation that Copley 
"was about to withdraw": about to withdraw, that is, in utter disregard 
for the social purposes of his visit, for not only had Copley failed to 
cultivate Drowne's professional friendship, he had not even offered the 
common civilities of social conversation. Hawthorne's disrespect for the 
social forms of his characters' interactions could not be more plain. This 
disrespect is justified, however, because for Hawthorne moral knowledge 
was a matter of inward experience, and from that perspective social con- 
versation and amenities could only be regarded as external and shapeless. 
Thoreau once complained, for example, how "hollow and ineffectual ... 
is our ordinary conversation. Surface meets surface. When our life ceases 
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to be inward and private, conversation degenerates into mere gossip."'8 
In the economy of Hawthorne's fiction, there is no room for mere "gos- 
sip." Hawthorne is unwilling to permit his characters simply to talk; he 
will not portray them performing the dance of social formalities 1 He is 
interested instead in moral reality, and significant interactions between 
his characters thus occur when their inner experiences touch and engage. 
One thinks of the "contagion" that overcomes Robin at the conclusion 
of "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," or of the "continual flow of natural 
emotion" that, like an "infection," reveals the "wild wishes and child- 
ish projects" of the family in "The Ambitious Guest." Apart from such 
affective exchanges, Hawthorne's characters have virtually no social 
existence. 
Indeed, Hawthorne often deliberately stylizes interactions between his 
characters that do not seriously engage their experience. For example, 
when Drowne promises Captain Hunnewell to keep the secret of his fig- 
urehead, Hawthorne continues: 
Captain Hunnewell then took Drowne by the button, and communicated his 
wishes in so low a tone that it would be unmannerly torepeat what was evi- 
dently intended for the carver's private ar. We shall, therefore, take the oppor- 
tunity to give the reader a few desirable particulars about Drowne himself (348). 
The effect of this narrative transition is to make the reader feel as if he 
were a member of a theatrical audience witnessing a stage whisper, as if 
he had received one of those "little slaps at credulity" for which James 
took Trollope to task.'0 Hawthorne can intervene in this manner, how- 
ever, because of his assumption that the credulity of his narrative depends 
upon his rendition of the reality of his characters' inward experiences 
rather than upon his portrayal of outward appearances or actions. When 
Drowne bends over to embrace the statue, for example, the patent theat- 
ricality of the gesture is irrelevant to Hawthorne's design; the gesture is 
merely a conventionalized sign pointing to Drowne's true inner feelings, 
and has no other fictional purpose. The same conventionalization also 
characterizes Hawthorne's rendition of dialogue. Copley's theatrical ex- 
clamations in the presence of the statue make no attempt to mimic actual 
speech; they are instead meant only to express his inward experience of 
18 Thoreau, "Life Without Principle," in The Portable Thoreau, ed. Carl Bode (New 
York: Viking, 1964), 654. 
19 Unless, of course, Hawthorne is interested in demonstrating, as in "Feathertop: A 
Moralized Legend," that his characters exist only in the "completely and consummately 
artificial" world of "a well-digested conventionalism." See Mosses From an Old Manse, 
274-75. 
20 Henry James, The Future of the Novel: Essays on the Art of Fiction, ed. Leon Edel (New 
York: Vintage, 1956), 247. 
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Drowne's art. Dialogue thus performs a chiefly expressive function, and 
this function is compatible with widely various forms of speech, ranging 
from Copley's measured eloquence, to Captain Ahab's Shakespearean 
rhetoric in Melville's Moby Dick, to the outright heatrical dialogue of the 
"Midnight, Forecastle" chapter of that romance. 
Another way of looking at this issue is that for Hawthorne action and 
dialogue are not constitutive of character. Character is instead defined by 
an orientation to the objective realm of spirit, which is to say by the 
internal organization of experience. In his description of the relationship 
between the Portuguese lady and Drowne's statue, Hawthorne illustrates 
how art can reproduce the experiential organization of its subject: 
The face (of the Portuguese lady) with its brilliant depth of complexion had 
the same piquancy of mirthful mischief that was fixed upon the countenance of 
the image, but which was here varied and continually shifting, yet always 
essentially the same, like the sunny gleam upon a bubbling foundation (359). 
The "mirthful mischief' of the lady, while affected by the flux of 
everyday life, nevertheless remains "essentially the same." It is her set- 
tled mode of being, and, for Hawthorne, the essence of her character. It is 
this essence that is captured and presented by Drowne's marvelous art. In 
a similar manner, the core of Drowne's character for Hawthorne will be 
the presence or absence of the "sensibility" (362) kindled by his love, and 
his actions and dialogue will be expressive of this essence. The techniques 
which Hawthorne uses to represent character, action, and dialogue, in 
short, are deeply influenced by the moral reality which he is striving to 
establish. This moral reality, which defines the nineteenth-century 
American romance, can, in its most general form, be characterized by two 
principles. First, there exists a concealed reality of spirit which is the 
locus of human value and meaning. I shall call this spiritual reality the 
"privileged order," since it is a realm where morality and power coincide 
and where the usual constraints of time and space do not apply. Second, 
this privileged order can be known only through a form of knowledge that 
is personal and experiential. Unlike scientific information, knowledge of 
the privileged order is not public or transferable through education or train- 
ing. It involves instead private and immediate forms of discernment, such 
as intuition, sympathy, imagination, or the emotions. "Without imagina- 
tion," says Melville in his chapter on the whiteness of the whale, "no man 
can follow another into these halls." The family of aesthetic characteris- 
tics that flows from these two principles is that which we recognize as 
the nineteenth-century American romance. 
These two principles may perhaps best be conceived as assumptions 
that systematically create an entire field of meaning in which they are 
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themselves transcended. The force of this field can persist even if both 
assumptions are specifically denied. In Pierre, for example, Melville 
pointedly rejects both assumptions, concluding that the world consists 
of nothing but surface stratified on surface. To its axis, the world being 
nothing but superinduced superficies. By vast pains we mine into the pyramid; 
by horrible gropings we come to the central room; with joy we espy the sar- 
cophagus; but we lift he lid-and no body is there! -appallingly vacant as vast 
is the soul of a man!21 
For Melville this spiritual vacancy was appalling, leaving him in the grip 
of an agonizing nihilism. This nihilism, however, was but the negative 
reflection of his initial assumptions. If Melville had not expected to find an 
objective moral order revealed within the divinity of the individual soul, 
he would not have despaired at its absence. His premises defined the con- 
ditions of his despair. The field of meaning created by the assumptions of the 
romance survived in Melville despite his rejection of those assumptions. 
After Pierre, it took almost forty painful years before Melville was able 
to free himself from this field of meaning. In Billy Budd, he eventually 
composed a novel that could face the "monotonous blank" of nature 
and yet allow that moral meaning could legitimately be the product of 
merely human society and institutions. After much struggle, Melville had 
come to accept what the sociologist Lester Ward, born a generation after 
Melville, naturally assumed: "Nature is wholly unmoral ... The preva- 
lent view that ethics is a vast system coextensive with the universe be- 
longs to that class of vainglorious conceptions that make up the an- 
thropocentric philosophy of the prescientific period and of the uninformed 
generally, and tends, like all crude and vaunting ideas, to render men 
arrogant and intolerant." The moral universe inhabited by Ward was one 
in which, as William James put it, "the words 'good,' 'bad,' and 'obliga- 
tion' . . . mean no absolute natures, independent of personal support. 
They are objects of feeling and desire, which have no foothold or anchor- 
age in Being, apart from the existence of actually living minds." 22 
This universe is familiar to us, for it is essentially our own. We find it 
visible, to use Edwin Cady's felicitous phrase, in "the light of common 
day." For Cady this light permits the "common vision" upon which "the 
21 Melville, Pierre: Or, the Ambiguities (1852; rpt. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. 
Press, 1971), 285. 
22 Melville, "Billy Budd," in Great Short Works of Herman Melville, ed. Warner Berthoff 
(1924; rpt. New York: Harper, 1969), 485; Ward, "Sociology and Psychology," The Ameri- 
can Journal of Sociology, 1 (1896), 621; James, "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral 
Life," The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy and Human Immortality 
(New York: Dover, 1956), 197. 
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possibility of literary realism hangs.23 Once it is understood, however, 
that all literature rests upon common vision and that, so to speak, the 
atmospheric effects evolve in time, the nature of that vision, rather than 
its mutuality, suddenly becomes problematic. Henry James's "The Real 
Thing" explores the nature of that vision, investigating inits own intense 
way the manner in which reality can also be problematic for the realist. 
* * * 
"The Real Thing" is narrated by an artist who, despite ambitions to 
paint portraits, earns his living doing black and white illustrations for 
books. An impoverished gentleman and his wife, Major and Mrs. 
Monarch, importune him to hire them as models for his work on society 
novels. They are "the real thing" (57, 61), by which James's narrator 
means that they are "essentially and typically smart" (47), "all conven- 
tion and patent leather" (65).24 More from pity than anything else, the 
artist hires the couple, but very quickly discovers that he cannot draw 
from them because they are too stiff. His work degenerates and he is 
forced to fire them. He decides instead to draw his society figures from 
two "make-believe" (57) models: Miss Churm, a freckled cockney girl, 
and Oronte, an Italian street-vendor. 
The story early on draws a distinction between photography and art. 
Major and Mrs. Monarch, we are told, have been photographed a great 
many times, and are excellent photographic subjects. Yet while trying to 
draw Mrs. Monarch, James's narrator admits: 
I could see she had been photographed often, but somehow the very habit 
that made her good for that purpose unfitted her for mine.... After a few times I
began to find her too insurmountably stiff; do what I would with it my drawing 
looked like a photograph or a copy of a photograph. Her figure had no variety of 
expression-she herself had no sense of variety. You may say that this was 
my business, was only a question of placing her. I placed her in every conceiva- 
ble position, but she managed to obliterate their differences. She was always a 
lady certainly, and into the bargain was always the same lady. She was the real 
thing, but always the same thing (55-56). 
Photographic copies of reality produce results no better than Drowne's 
mechanical carvings. James thus stands with Hawthorne in support of the 
position that an artist cannot passively acquiesce in circumstances, but 
23 Cady, The Light of Common Day: Realism in American Fiction (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1971), 20. 
24 All page references to "The Real Thing" are from Henry James, Selected Short Stories, 
ed. Michael Swan (New York: Penguin, 1963). 
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must actively transform and develop his material. For sentiments uch as 
these, James has often been termed a romancer, but this is to miss his 
essential inversion of the terms of the romancer's dilemma. For Drowne 
the task was to penetrate beneath a shapeless outward appearance to a 
deeper and truer spiritual reality; James's narrator, on the other hand, 
never denigrates the outward reality of the Monarchs-in fact he stresses 
it-he only claims that for art adequately to represent precisely this real- 
ity, the artist must have a certain freedom. This is because, as James's 
narrator puts it, "the defect of the real . . . [is] so apt to be a lack of 
representation" (50). 
The supreme virtue of the novel, James tells us, is "the air of reality 
(solidity of specification)." In part this is a question of aesthetic craft; the 
illusion of reality cannot be generated by a mere photographic copy of 
reality. "The novelist who doesn't represent, and represent 'all the time,' 
is lost." The novel works through "the value of composition." 25 But this 
question yields to a more fundamental inquiry: assuming all the required 
craft, what is the precise nature of the reality which the novel must strive 
to construct so as to be able to attain its end of meaning? James's rejection 
of photographic reality is essentially the same as his rejection of Zola's 
scientific naturalism: he failed to see the moral meaning in it. He could 
find in it no "pearl of philosophy, of suggestion, or just homely 
recognition." 
Our various senses, sight, smell, sound, taste, are ... more or less convinced; 
but when the particular effect upon each of these is added to the effect upon 
the others the mind still remains bewilderedly unconscious of any use for the 
total.26 
A photographic opy of reality, in other words, does not produce the moral 
reality required by the novel. 
James's own particular "use," the hook upon which he preferred to 
hang his meaning, was "the perfect dependence of the 'moral' sense of a 
work of art on the amount of felt life concerned in producing it." And 
"felt life" meant, above all, the consciousness of relation. "The figures in 
any picture, the agents in any drama, are interesting only in proportion as 
they feel their respective situations; since the consciousness, on their 
part, of the complication exhibited forms for us their link of connection 
with it." 27 
25 James, "TheArtofFiction," in TheFutureoftheNovel, 14; and TheArtoftheNovel (New 
York: Scribner's, 1962), 94, 99. 
26 James, "Emile Zola," in Notes on Novelists (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1914), 
51-52. 
27 James, Art of the Novel, 45, 62. 
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The necessity and difficulty of perceiving such consciousness of rela- 
tion constitutes the inner drama of "The Real Thing." Its narrator is 
straightforward about his purposes: 
I adored variety and range, I cherished human accidents, the illustrative note; 
I wanted to characterize closely, and the thing in the world I most hated was the 
danger of being ridden by a type.... I held that everything was to be sacrificed 
sooner than character (56). 
When his friends argue with him that type could easily be character, he 
answers, "Whose? It couldn't be everybody's-it might end in being 
nobody's" (56). And here the word "type" is not used in the sense in 
which it is employed by the romance, to signify a physical embodiment of 
the privileged order, but rather it is meant in its representative sense, in its 
meaning as the typical. A typical character, for James, is nobody's 
character. It is a social abstraction, without individuality, without any 
consciousness of relation. 
For James's narrator, however, the Monarchs are precisely a social 
abstraction. They are for him "essentially and typically smart," "all con- 
vention and patent leather." Behind this conventional exterior, the nar- 
rator can see nothing but "the blankness, the deep intellectual repose of 
the twenty years of country-house visiting which had given them pleasant 
intonations" (49). 
James rather broadly hints that his narrator's inability to use the 
Monarchs as models is at least in part due to his own incapacity to see 
behind this social facade. And what in contrast makes James's story 
succeed and saves it from being a rather simple parable on the nature of 
representation, is its fine final illumination of the depths of pain and 
humiliation that lie underneath the Monarchs' conventional exterior. 
When they are fired from their job as models, they return to ask for work 
as servants. "When it came over me, the latent eloquence of what they 
were doing, I confess that my drawing was blurred for a moment-the 
picture swam" (68). Although James is careful not to sentimentalize the 
situation and to make clear that models are not paid to be reticent, his 
eloquent revelation of the Monarchs' feelings contrasts sharply with his 
narrator's need for the assistance of professional models, and highlights 
his narrator's inability truly to penetrate to the significance of "the real 
thing." 
The aesthetic strategy which James pursues in presenting this revela- 
tion provides an instructive contrast to the romance. In "The Old Apple 
Dealer," Hawthorne set himself the task of sketching "a character which 
is . . . of too negative a description to be seized upon and represented to 
the imaginative vision by word painting." As in the relation of the 
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Monarchs to James's narrator, the apple dealer seems to lack the charac- 
ter to sustain art. Hawthorne solves this challenge and endows his subject 
with moral meaning by placing the peddler within the context of the 
privileged order. At the climax of the story, Hawthorne is able to justify 
this apostrophe: 
Many would say you have hardly individuality enough to be the object of your 
own self-love. How, then, can a stranger's eye detect anything in your mind and 
heart o study and to wonder at? Yet, could I read but a tithe of what is written 
there, it would be a volume of deeper and more comprehensive import han all 
that the wisest mortals have given to the world; for the soundless depths of the 
human soul and of eternity have an opening through your breast.28 
Hawthorne thus manages to give significance to the apple dealer and to 
his story by the evocation of an ontologically distinct realm of value. 
James, on the other hand, gives meaning to the Monarchs and to his story 
by the technique of widening our field of vision. The suffering of the 
Monarchs is not of a different order of reality from that which has oc- 
curred in the rest of the story. James does not rely on a distinct realm of 
value to achieve significance, but rather simply lets us more thoroughly 
understand the consciousness of his subjects. And from this contrast we 
may deduce the first of our characterizations of the moral reality of 
American realism: the privileged order has ceased to exist.29 Note the 
consequences of this fact for the narrative organization of these two 
stories. The effect of the final revelation of "The Old Apple Dealer" is 
meant to rest on paradox. The more insignificant the peddler, the more 
unprepared the reader for the final illumination of meaning, the more 
sharply drawn is the point that the realm of value and "eternity" subsists 
everywhere. The power and the prevalence of the privileged order is thus 
underscored by the very contrast between outward appearance and spir- 
itual reality. As Emerson emphasized in his essay on "The Poet," "[t]he 
meaner the type by which a law is expressed, the more pungent it is, and 
the more lasting in the memories of men." 30 Precisely the reverse is true 
28 Hawthorne, "The Old Apple Dealer, Mosses From an Old Manse, 502-03. 
29 This does not imply that realism will not contain supernatural elements, but it does 
imply that these elements will remain precisely anomalous, the "objective side" of which, as 
James so accurately understood, "will practically run thin," and the meaning of which must 
finally be tied to "somebody's normal relation to something." See Art of the Novel, 256. 
Mark Twain said it more bluntly in his essay on "Fenimore Cooper's Literary Offenses": 
"The personages of a tale shall confine themselves to possibilities and let miracles alone; or, 
if they venture a miracle, the author must so plausibly set it forth as to make it look possible 
and reasonable." Selected Shorter Writing of Mark Twain, ed. Walter Blair (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 228. 
30 "The Poet," in Ralph Waldo Emerson: Essays and Journals, ed. Lewis Mumford 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 254. 
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for James's creation of meaning in the Monarchs: the more unprepared we 
are for the final illumination oftheir suffering, the less likely we are to find 
it significant. This is usually explained by the fact that realism relies for 
effect upon plausibility. The point to be made, however, is that such 
plausibility would be meaningless if moral reality were understood to be 
discontinuous with ordinary experience. 
Although the privileged order created a hiatus between outward ap- 
pearance and spiritual reality, it also functioned, on a deeper level, to unify 
the world. Nature, society, and character all participated in the privileged 
order, all shared a common moral essence, and thus could all be known 
through an identical form of experiential knowledge. With the demise of 
the privileged order this unity disappeared. Not only did nature, society, 
and character become separate subjects of knowledge, but they also be- 
came the objects of distinct forms of inquiry. Nature began to be under- 
stood in the language of science, society in that of manners and decorum, 
character in that of psychology or, in James's words, "the beautiful cir- 
cuit and subterfuge of our thought and our desire." It is thus possible to 
understand James's critique of Zola's naturalism as an indictment of a 
kind of category mistake-the mistake of applying an analytic of things to 
human beings-a perspective which must inevitably miss "the human 
note" and fail in "the perception of character, of the very way that people 
feel and think and act." 31 
The locus of meaning in "The Real Thing" lies in the interplay between 
two of these ways of understanding the world. The story vibrates between 
its narrator's perception of the Monarchs as social "types," and his ap- 
prehension of the "felt life" that constitutes their character. This is a 
general characteristic of American nineteenth-century realism, which 
took as its particular province of meaning "the organic, indissoluble con- 
nection between man as a private individual and man as a social being, as 
a member of a community." 32 For realism moral reality hinged on the 
delicate interaction between social and personal ways of knowing, be- 
tween the humanization of convention and the socialization of the 
individual. 
Developing simultaneously with the emergence of the professional so- 
cial sciences,33 American realism, one might say, discovered the social 
field. This is perhaps its most striking point of departure from the ro- 
31 James, The Art of the Novel, 32; James, The Future of the Novel, 95-96. 
32 Georg Lukacs, Studies in European Realism (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964), 8. 
33 See Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American 
Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (Urbana: Univ. 
of Illinois Press, 1977). In terms that could easily be applied to the development of realism, 
Haskell explains the emergence of professional social science as a response to the "growing 
interdependence among all components of society, individual as well as institutional" (28). 
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mance. As we have seen, the romance did not respect the world of social 
conventions and forms. As Melville said in Mardi, "however desirable as 
incidental attainments, conventionalities, in themselves, [are] the very 
least of arbitrary trifles; the knowledge of them innate with no man."34 
Moral reality for the romance was not a matter of social rules of behavior, 
but of the privileged order, which, like the "eternity" that opened into the 
old apple dealer's breast, was perceived to be timeless and unaffected by 
the vagaries of particular social mores. The privileged order could only be 
known through personal experience, and this experience was thus con- 
ceived as the mirror image of the privileged order. It was understood to be 
universal and untouched by superficial social characteristics: 
For Man, like God, abides the same 
Always, through all variety 
Of woven garments to the frame.35 
The literary task of the romance was thus to penetrate through the "gar- 
ments" to the "frame." It therefore tended to portray significant interac- 
tions between characters in ways that transcended particular social forms 
and directly expressed universal inward experiences. One thinks, for 
example of the "abounding, affectionate, friendly, loving feeling" de- 
scribed in the "A Squeeze of the Hand" chapter of Moby Dick, or of the 
"wild, mystical sympathetical feeling" through which Ahab spiritually 
overpowers his crew.36 Both feelings are manifestations of universal 
human emotions, and both refuse to be confined by any particular social 
context. The difficulty faced by the romance, however, was that the con- 
ventionalities of everyday life continually interfered with such direct ex- 
pressions of experience. Hawthorne thus complained of the difficulty of 
writing a romance in America where "actualities" were "so terribly in- 
sisted upon." 
No author, without a trial, can conceive of the difficulty ofwriting a romance 
about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no pic- 
turesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a commonplace prosperity, in 
broad and simple daylight.... It will be very long, I trust, before romance 
writers may find congenial and easily handled themes ... in any characteristic 
and probable vents of our individual lives. Romance and poetry, ivy, lichens, 
and wall-flowers, need ruin to make them grow.37 
34 Melville, Mardi: and a Voyage Thither (1849; rpt. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. 
Press, 1970), 246. 
35 Melville, Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage in the Holy Land (1876; rpt. New York: 
Hendricks, 1960), 481. 
36 Melville, Moby Dick: Or, The Whale (1851; rpt. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 532, 
239. 
37 Hawthorne, Pref., The Marble Faun (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1888), 15. 
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In the "broad and simple daylight" of American prosperity there were no 
settings in which the social forms of the "characteristic and probable 
events of our individual lives" could be set aside and universal experience 
be permitted to flourish. 
With the demise of the privileged order the concept of universal human 
experience lost its preferred moral position. For the realist, human ex- 
perience was legitimate and important even if it were only the contingent 
result of particular social customs. Indeed, so great was the accumulated 
influence of social conventions, that the realist, like the new social scien- 
tists, began to view character as inherently socialized. Thus James could 
remark that "experience is our apprehension and our measure of what 
happens to us as social creatures." 38 From this perspective, it was natural 
for James to stand Hawthorne's complaint about the difficulties of Ameri- 
can authorship on its head. "It is on manners, customs, usages, habits, 
forms, upon all these things matured and established, that a novelist 
lives," he said in a letter to Howells: 
They are the very stuff his work is being made of; and in saying that in the 
absence of those 'dreary and worn-out paraphernalia' which I enumerate as 
being wanting in American society, 'we have simply the whole of human life 
left,' you beg (to my sense) the question. I should say we had just so much of it 
as these same 'paraphernalia' represent, and I think they represent an enor- 
mous quantity of it.39 
Unlike Hawthorne, James sought a richer social texture, one that would 
enable him to communicate that much more "felt life." 
Since for the realist experience was in large measure constituted by 
social conventions, characters in realist fiction must be regarded as the 
products of the social worlds they inhabit. The moral reality of the realist 
novel thus depends in part on the historical fidelity with which these 
worlds are reproduced. In contrast to the romance, therefore, dialogue in 
the realist novel is rendered in historically accurate dialect, while the 
speech of characters mimics socially accurate patterns of expression. 
Sometimes the representation of social texture achieves the density of 
anthropological description. Notice, for example, how James's narrator in 
"The Real Thing" describes an entrance of the Monarchs: 
[T]hey came in, the Major and his wife, with their society laugh about nothing 
(there was less and less to laugh at), like country-callers-they always re- 
minded me of that-who have walked across the park after church and are 
presently persuaded to stay to luncheon (65). 
38 James, The Art of the Novel, 64-65. 
3 The Letters of Henry James, ed. Percy Lubbock (London: Scribner's, 1920), I, 72-73. 
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The meaning of this passage finally rests on the accuracy of its social 
observation, but its allusions are so historically specific that they are 
momentarily opaque to the modern reader. Whether country callers ex- 
pected to be "persuaded" to stay to luncheon, for example, will tell the 
reader much about both the entrance of the Monarchs and the tradition of 
country calling. The reader, in other words, must be educated to under- 
stand the social customs that give meaning to behavior. But in this the 
reader is in no different situation than James's characters. In "Daisy 
Miller," for example, Winterbourne, trying to interpret Daisy's conduct, 
becomes "vexed at his want of instinctive certitude as to how far her 
eccentricities were generic, national, and how far they were personal," 
(185).40 Having "lived too long in foreign parts" (192), Winterbourne is 
unfamiliar with American social customs, and so unable accurately to 
assess the significance of Daisy's behavior. 
Winterbourne can, of course, acquire information about American so- 
cial practices; he can learn the social language that fixes and gives 
meaning to Daisy's behavior. In realism, therefore, unlike in the romance, 
the exercise of moral judgment depends upon a form of knowledge that is 
public and transmissible. The understanding ofmoral reality increases as 
this knowledge becomes more comprehensive. As Winterbourne l arns 
more about Daisy's conduct and social context, he is able to evaluate her 
character with more assurance. In this sense action in the realist novel is 
constitutive of character, in contrast o the romance, in which action is 
expressive of character. Winterbourne's inquiry, for example, may be 
profitably compared to that of Coverdale in The Blithedale Romance. 
Coverdale's knowledge of Zenobia's lack of virginity does not derive from 
his perception of her actions or her social circumstances. It is instead a 
personal and immediate impression, a direct intuition "unauthorized by 
any circumstance or suggestion that had made its way to my ears." 41 Like 
Coverdale, the reader of the romance is given direct access to the 
"ethereal essence" of the romance's characters, and the task of the ro- 
mancer is to demonstrate how the essence of a character adiates through 
his actions, speech, gestures, clothing, and other accoutrements. The task 
of the realist, on the other hand, is to constitute his characters through the 
presentation of successive layers of information. The reader must then 
construct and evaluate the novel's characters on the basis of the informa- 
tion provided him, just as Winterbourne must attempt to grasp the charac- 
ter of Daisy. In this process realism assumes a certain degree of cultural 
education among its readers. Thus, while the romancer wrote for "the 
40 All references to "Daisy Miller" are from Henry James, Selected Short Stories, ed. 
Michael Swan (New York: Penguin, 1963). 
41 Nathaniel Hawthorne, The Blithedale Romance (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1883), 372. 
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mighty heart"42 of the world, the realist wrote for those with "taste." 
"Don't pretend . . . to have pretty illusions about the public," says Jack 
Hawley, a critical friend of James's narrator in "The Real Thing." "It's 
not for such animals you work-it's for those who know, coloro che 
sanno" (64).43 
In "Daisy Miller" Winterbourne ventually learns that Daisy's conduct 
cannot be adequately encompassed by any code of social usage. She is 
"completely uncultivated"(149) and "very ignorant"(162). But Daisy is 
also imbued with an intensity of life which no education can produce. 
James is of two minds about this intensity. On the one hand, he considers 
it to be dangerous, leading Daisy recklessly to her death in the malaria- 
infested Roman Colosseum. It is "unreasoning" (171) and "inscrutable" 
(184), without communicable moral shape or form. On the other hand, it 
is, as the springtime flower of her name indicates, a vital source of life- 
renewing energy. Winterbourne, who cannot respond to this energy, re- 
mains at the conclusion of the novel imprisoned by the forms of social 
propriety and as personally lifeless as his name suggests. This tension 
within Daisy Miller exposes the underlying moral paradox of realism, for 
if the self is social, what is the individual? Just as the romance is the locus 
of a struggle between spiritual reality and outward appearance, so the 
realist novel is the scene of a constant struggle between society and 
character. Individuals are social, they can only be adequately understood 
through "manners, customs, usages, habits, forms"; yet, as Daisy Miller 
or the Monarchs make clear, they are notjust social. Social conventions 
are given by society, yet they must be inhabited by individuals, with their 
personal feelings and desires. 
This moral paradox causes realist fiction to be filled with flickering back 
and forth between social and psychological perspectives. This doubleness 
is not, as it is sometimes characterized, a dialectic between appearance 
and reality,44 but a competition between two ways of understanding the 
same events, neither of which can exist without the other. Social stand- 
ards and conventions give shape and form to the energies of the self, while 
these energies in turn animate and give meaning to social usages. It is in 
this mutual dependence of the social and the psychological that the realist 
novel finds its domain of moral significance. The mistake of the narrator 
of "The Real Thing" is in viewing the Monarchs only as social conven- 
tions. On the other hand, we are not moved at the conclusion of the story 
42 Melville, Mardi, 600. 
43 At the same time, however, the realist novel was more comfortable than the romance 
in "educating" its audience to problems of social or political concern. 
4 See, for example, Marius Bewley, The Complex Fate: Hawthorne, Henry James, and 
Some Other American Writers (London: Chatto and Windus, 1952), 79-114. 
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merely because we are shown the humiliation of the Monarchs-if by that 
is meant a psychological state abstracted from social significance. We are 
moved rather because their suffering is embodied within the "eloquence" 
of a social gesture, in their offer to become the narrator's servants. The 
gesture both defines and reveals their pain to the narrator and ourselves. 
* * * 
Richard Rorty has recently and forcefully observed that "'objective 
truth' is no more and no less than the best idea we currently have to 
explain what is going on." The concept of moral reality requires us seri- 
ously to confront he fact that in the past the "objective" world of human 
meaning has differed in fundamental ways from our own. The romancer 
inhabited a world in which, as Melville put it in White-Jacket, the earth 
was "a fast-sailing, never-sinking world-frigate, of which God was the 
shipwright," and whose "final haven was predestinated ere we slipped 
from the stocks at Creation." It was a world in which "we ourselves are 
the repositories of the secret packet" that would dispel the mysteries of 
the voyage. We recognize the aesthetic consequences that flow from 
the attempt to represent such a world in fiction as the genre of the ro- 
mance. The genre of the realist novel, on the other hand, is the aesthetic 
result of the attempt to represent in fiction a world in which value has no 
distinct ontological status, and in which human meaning is perceived to 
reside in the unending and indissoluble tension between self and society.45 
To understand the problem of genre in this fashion thus not only per- 
mits the aesthetic attributes of a genre to be systematically identified and 
explained, but also permits these attributes to be related in a coherent 
manner to the circumstances of cultural and intellectual history. 
45 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1980), 
385; Melville, White-Jacket; Or, The World in a Man-of-War (1850; rpt. Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970), 398-99. 
